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Abstract. The idea that the concept of 'violence' was part and is still 
viewed as part of a broad philosophical category may seem strange. 
However, the problem is resolved by referring to the concept of 'force,' 
which is lost in modern philosophy. The exception was the works in which 
we find some “traces” of this concept, including the works of Aristotle, 
which need to be free from modernizing interpretations. Still, in the 
translations of Aristotle, the Greek word δύναμις, used in its traditional 
meaning of potentiality, lost its connotations of force (movement, 
capability, function); in turn, 'force' was no longer linked with 'violence' 
(βια) and 'necessity.' Violence is seen as a kind of necessity, which is 
associated with the suppression of 'will,' freedom, something 'frustrating 
desire' and contrary to 'common sense,' as well as the absence of 'good.' 
Violence is presented not only in an ontological sense, but also 
existentially, as the opposite of 'good' and one's own 'desire.' Force stays in 
the background of 'necessity' as 'potentiality', 'potential energy' and 
'movement', and violence loses the opposition that has arisen in the 
ontological mode.   
Introduction  
Initially, we turned to the hermeneutics of the texts of Aristotle in the existing Russian 
translations, trying to give our own understanding of violence in the modern philosophical 
context in view of its categorical inadequacy. Philosophical categorization presupposes the 
primary definition of an interpretable phenomenon, but the existing conceptual forms 
turned out to be “insufficient” and left a certain “gap” between the phenomenon and the 
notion 'violence', giving rise to an obvious semantic and conceptual uncertainty in 
understanding violence. 
We intuitively regarded the studied categorical links 'man – violence', 'violence – being', 
'violence – non-violence' as implicitly belonging to the historical and philosophical 
categorical context. Not only in domestic, but also in Western public (and scientific!) 
discourse, the problematic field of violence was loaded, above all, with political and ethical 
meanings and senses – political apology or ethical criticism of violence. 
We tried to draw upon the meanings of the native, Russian language, but even here it 
was found that in everyday usage the term 'violence' often carries a “negative connotation”, 
but it does not exhaust language meanings – in living and historical languages everything is 
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more complicated. In “The Explanatory Dictionary of the Living Great Russian Language” 
by Vladimir Dahl we can find the meaning of such terms as ‘насилить’ (to violate), 
‘насиловать’ (to force oneself on sb), ‘насиливать’ (to do violence to), which suggest the 
following meanings: to enforce, to constrain, to compel to something by force, to coerce. 
There are also terms ‘насилие’ (violence) and ‘насильство’ (coercion) used in the 
following meanings: compulsion, bondage, need of force, restraining action, insulting, 
illegal and willful action. There are some more meanings: arbitrariness, life under 
oppression, to control or keep in submission with force (violence) [11, p. 1218]. We singled 
out the meanings that already initially contain certain intuitive philosophical connotations. 
First, it is obvious that negative meanings do not prevail here. Secondly, the meaning of 
'compulsion' and 'un/freedom' (bondage) is retained. Thirdly, there appears a connection 
with everyday resentment and 'constraint', 'illegality' and 'domination' (life under 
oppression), and, finally, with pragmatic governance. As we see, the Russian language, “the 
great and mighty” as “the house of being” (Heidegger), contains many hidden meanings, 
and at the same time opens up large space for our categorization. 
We would like to give a hermeneutic understanding of force and violence in the context 
of Aristotle’s philosophy, and, above all, to dwell on the “Russian Aristotle,” or rather, the 
Russian reading of Aristotle (mentioned by colleagues from St. Petersburg), to which 
young V.V. Rozanov contributed after the publication of his treatise “On Understanding”, 
which has not yet been recognized as hermeneutic and still remains unappreciated. In his 
letter to N.N. Strakhov on February 15, 1888, V.V. Rozanov writes: “For about two years, 
while getting acquainted with various works…, more and more I became convinced, or 
rather, had a hunch that the root of the matter, the key to the resolution of many questions, 
which for me means to live or die, is in Aristotle” [10, p. 153]. In his letters, N.N. Strakhov 
expressed some skepticism about the Russian relevance and topicality of Aristotle, although 
he appreciated Rozanov's translation, perceiving it as a kind of cultural act, and proposed 
his personal assistance in its publication. Still, in his comments of 1913 to the letter of 23 
February, 1888 from N.N. Strakhov, as if continuing their dispute, V.V. Rozanov notes: “I 
am still convinced that Aristotle remains indispensable” [10, p. 9].    
In these comments we can find a rather remarkable idea of V.V. Rozanov about the 
place of 'dynamis' and 'energy' in Aristotle’s categorical series: “... the concepts of δύναμις 
and ενέργεια in their Latin terms potentia and actus (I only don’t really understand actus; in 
my work I have always talked about potentiality and actuality; actually, in my work it 
means a 'forming existence', but we did not get to this in “Met”) serve as a key to 
understanding the most complex and profound systems of philosophy. In them, as in 
mysterious symbols, the whole system of thought is expressed, and this and that have 
become clear (change is the main thing) ...” [10, p. 154]. And in the next letter of March 2, 
1888, about his translation and interpretation of Aristotle, he continued his thought: “I want 
to familiarize myself with it in order to find out more about his conceptions of potentiality 
(this is the most important thing), which he first introduced into philosophy and probably 
well elaborated” [10, p. 160]. No one has yet truly appreciated this Rozanov's hermeneutics 
of Aristotle's “Metaphysics”, although it is very important, in particular for understanding 
the ancient meanings of the phenomenon of violence.  
Therefore, we were surprised by the new translations of Aristotle, which reduce the 
inflectedness of the ancient Greek language, which is cognate to Russian and German, to a 
primitive modernizing analyticity. Thus, for example, A.V. Markov quite consciously not 
only limits the meanings of the Aristotelian δύναμις and ενέργεια, but simply misinterprets 
them, as well as some other categories: “Therefore, let the reader not be surprised that I 
often translate 'logos' as 'formula' (and rarely 'proportion', Kubitsky often uses 'definition'), 
'atom' as 'individual', 'genesis' as 'production', several times I describe 'art' as 'cooking', I 
translate 'energy' simply and solely as 'actuality', and, following the Russian poets and 
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prosaist of the XX century, I prefer the word 'existence' to the word 'essence' [9 p. 8]. It is 
natural that Markov’s translation of Aristotelian "Metaphysics" received a fair criticism of 
specialists [13, p.361-385]. Trying to supposedly update Aristotle’s vocabulary and at the 
same time preserve his identity, as if bringing him closer to the languages of “Mandelstam 
and Pasternak, Platonov and Nabokov”, A.V. Markov does not seem to know that it is 
impossible to combine the innovative language of Nabokov or the avant-garde language of 
Pasternak with the deliberately archaized style of Platonov or Mandelstam. In the same 
way, it is difficult to combine the actualization of the Aristotelian language with the 
restoration of its archaic primordial meanings.   
M. Heidegger will speak and write about the actualizing reading of Aristotle with the 
simultaneous restoration of the original identity only about thirty-five years after V.V. 
Rozanov! Heidegger's “love for Aristotle” began early: at the time of his studies at the 
theological faculty. But it was in his lectures at the Faculty of Philosophy that he called on 
his students to turn to Aristotle from modernity and return to the ancient meanings of his 
concepts, which did not mean, however, a kind of modernization of ancient philosophy. It 
rather meant the archaization of modern (relevant) philosophy, the search through the 
restoration of the original meanings of a specific philosophical language that had been lost 
by modern philosophy and translational modernization. And then he translates δύναμις, 
meaning in modern German Vermögen, Kraft, Fähigkeit (force, capability , potentiality), as 
das bestimmte Verfügenkönnen über; Bereitschaft zu ... (a certain ability to have control; 
readiness to...) [12, p. 210]. One may be surprised at the quirkiness of Heidegger’s 
translations, but at the same time he was solving the mystifying tasks of constructing his 
adequate philosophical language through reading the thesaurus of the philosophy of 
antiquity, but he didn’t impose modernizing meanings or avant-garde translations on the 
ancient vocabulary.  
No, we are surprised by a different thing: how the Greek δύναμις, used for the 
traditional delivery of the Aristotelian interpretation of the category of potentiality, lost its 
connotations of force (movement, capability, function); in turn, 'force' lost its link with 
'violence' (βια) and 'necessity'.   
Findings   
We believe that before referring to the categorization of violence in Aristotle’s works one 
should start with the reading of the works “Physics” [3], “On the Heavens” [2] and 
“Metaphysics” [1], which were hardly read by anyone from this perspective [8]. Therefore, 
we are surprised by the new translations of Aristotle, which reduce the inflectedness of the 
ancient Greek language to a primitive modernizing analyticity [5]. So, for example, A.V. 
Markov consciously limits the meanings of the Aristotelian δύναμις and ενέργεια, as well 
as some other categories [9, p. 8]. We are surprised by this, since the Greek δύναμις 
(dynamis), used for the traditional delivery of the Aristotelian interpretation of the category 
of potentiality, also contains connotations of force (movement, capability, function); in 
turn, 'force' as 'violence' (βια) is linked with the category of necessity. 
In “Physics” we find a primary categorical disposition and association of δύναμις with 
force and movement [3, p. 123-124, 219-220 and others]. The study of the treatises “On the 
Heavens” and “Metaphysics” enables to expand the Aristotelian connotations δύναμι not 
only as 'potentialities', but also as 'forces', and in the interpretation of ενέργεια to avoid its 
understanding as 'actuality', associating it both with 'action', 'necessity' and 'violence'. In his 
treatise “On the Heavens”, Aristotle, criticizing the Pythagorean “String Theory”, 
concludes that none of the “heavenly bodies” can move with the motion either of animate 
nature or of constraint, 'under compulsion'” [2, p. 323, 337]. Here force and violence are 
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regarded in inseparable connection with 'naturalness' or, in Russian, ‘естественность’ (the 
natural), as well as 'necessity'. 
But what senses does Aristotle implicate in 'violence' and 'constrained movement'? The 
movement 'of animate nature' obviously implies some kind of 'organicity', 'self-movement', 
but 'constraint' means 'unnaturalness' and 'compulsion' [2, p.345, 346]. But the Russian 
‘естественное’ (the natural) carries the meaning of 'existence', 'being', 'something real', 
conversely, ‘противоестественное’ (the unnatural) means 'something that is not real', non-
existent, which clearly results in the negative attributes of violence, its belonging to the 
non-existent, non-being, destruction. 
In this sense, unnaturalness is again linked with an action, some kind of activity or 
movement, whose nature is revealed when reading and interpreting “Metaphysics” [1, p. 
151]. Violence is understood here as such kind of necessity, which is associated with the 
suppression of freedom ('will'), something 'frustrating desire' ('realization of one’s own 
will') and contradicts 'common sense', as well as the absence of 'good'. Violence appears not 
only as a 'necessity' in its ontological sense, but also existentially, as the opposite of 'good' 
and one’s own 'desire'. And 'necessity' acts as fatal and inevitable, as the Goddess of 
Destiny or Destiny itself. Further, Aristotle (Book V, Chapter 12) [1, p. 162-164] regards 
'suffering' in connection with 'capability' or 'potentiality' (dynamis) as a 'shortage', 'void' 
and lack of 'ability'. It is not clear why the translator here preferred to translate dynamis as 
'potentiality', not 'force'. Force stays in the background of 'necessity' as 'potentiality', 
'potential energy' and 'movement', and violence loses the opposition arisen in an ontological 
mode. 
If we turn to “Metaphysics” in the translation of P.D. Pervov and V.V. Rozanov [4] and 
compare, we will see the substantiation of what we have already identified before (Book V, 
Chapter 12) [1, p. 163]: the concepts of 'destructive force', 'lack of ability', 'denial' are again 
closely linked with 'violence' as something that bears the non-existent, non-being and death. 
Again, there is a certain 'non-being', being minus something, but there is no violence as a 
characteristic of being, which is necessary not even as the second, but as the first in the 
categorical pair of force – violence. 
These meanings and the need for 'force' in the transition from 'potentiality' to 'actuality' 
arise further in the book (Book IX, Chapter 1) [1, p. 234-236]. Aristotle himself refers to 
them [1, p. 162-164], but the translator again stubbornly does not use the word 'force', 
although Stagirit writes: “We have pointed out elsewhere that ‘potentiality’ and the word 
'can' have several senses” [1, p. 234]. Whereas the word 'can' ('power') in Russian is 'force' 
(сила) ('to be able' (возмочь) and 'to overpower' (превозмочь) – to turn into actuality). 
With understanding of power as a “stronger” category of force, the dialectic of force and 
violence becomes apparent, which is revealed through the opposition of не/способность – 
способность (in/capability – capability); не/силие – сила – на/силие (un/forced – forced – 
violent).  
Research Method 
The study of the hermeneutic understanding of force and violence in the context of 
Aristotle’s philosophy is based on analytical, synthetic, and comparative methods. 
Conclusion 
Thus, we can find all the meanings of interest in Aristotle’s works, including the category 
dynamis which can be interpreted as force, and then 'force' as 'violence' (βια) can be linked 
with the categories of potentiality and necessity. Potential force as a capability in the 
 , 010 (2019)Web of Conferences https://doi.org/10.1051/shsconf /20197201024
APPSCONF- 2019  
SHS 72 24 
4
context of nature and necessity is placed in the context of naturalness – force and 
unnaturalness – violence as two equally possible sides of being. The unnatural nature is 
such a being, which is in need, and is linked with necessity as necessitation (compulsion), 
distortion of the real, natural good, or a kind of “seizure” of power. As a result, there is a 
collision of ‘action’ (energeia, force) with ‘counter/action’ (violence) as a clash between 
‘natural’ or ‘free’ force and “usurped” power, i.e. violence as usurpation of ‘will’.  
Naturally, the “Russian interpretation” of Aristotle must be supplemented with new 
translations and actualizing interpretations similar to what V.V. Rozanov did in his time, 
and Heidegger did in the twenties of the last century, if it is really possible... Likewise, it 
should be supplied with a retrospective analysis of the Greek text through the use of a 
modern thesaurus, a “cloud” of today’s senses, texts and authors. Thus, W. Benjamin, who 
has become popular today with his concept of ‘divine violence’, raises the question: is there 
something in the Aristotle’s game of forces and potentialities that does not contain violence 
and is absolutely ‘non-violent’?  
And Aristotle answers him: “Now some things owe their necessity to something other 
than themselves; others do not, but are themselves the source of necessity in other things. 
Therefore the necessary in the primary and strict sense is the simple; for this does not admit 
of more states than one, so that it cannot even be in one state and also in another; for if it 
did it would already be in more than one. If, then, there are any things that are eternal and 
unmovable (God – auth.), nothing compulsory or against their nature (emphasis added) 
attaches to them” [1, p. 151-152]. Only God is not subject to violence as such necessary, 
which is the most ‘simple’, ‘a simple force’, ‘a prime mover’ and ‘a prime cause’: “And life 
also belongs to God; for the actuality of thought is life, and God is that actuality; and God's 
self-dependent actuality is life most good and eternal. We say therefore that God is a living 
being, eternal, most good, so that life and duration continuous and eternal belong to God; 
for this is God” [1, p. 310]. God as true being is non/violence absolute. There is one step to 
Walter Benjamin [7, p. 65-99] with his ‘divine violence.’  
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